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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-409 
CITY OF WATERVLIET, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
JAMES F. MONAGHAN, CORPORATION COUNSEL (PETER M. TORNCELLO 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The City of Watervliet (City) has filed exceptions to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) on a unit clarification/placement 
petition filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). CSEA alleges in its petition 
that the newly created title of water systems supervisor either 
is in its existing unit or, if not, it should be placed in its 
unit. 
After a hearing, the Director dismissed the unit 
clarification aspect of the petition, but granted the unit 
placement aspect. In adding the water systems supervisor to 
CSEA's unit, the Director rejected the City's arguments that CSEA 
had waived by agreement any right to file this type of petition, 
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and that the incumbent, James Bulmer, is a managerial employee 
exempt from coverage under §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The City excepts on the grounds that the decision had to be 
rendered by the Administrative Law Judge who conducted the 
hearing, that it had not agreed that the title should be added to 
CSEA's unit if Bulmer was held to be a covered employee, and that 
Bulmer is managerial because the job description^ for his 
position states that the incumbent represents management and 
assists the City in collective negotiations. 
CSEA has moved to dismiss the exceptions upon the ground, as 
established by affidavits, that the City did not serve it with 
the exceptions as required by §201.12(a) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). The City has not responded to CSEA's motion. 
Our Rules require both service of exceptions and the filing 
of proof of service. According to the evidence before us, the 
City has done neither. The failure to serve the exceptions in 
accordance with the requirements of the Rules necessitates 
dismissal of the exceptions pursuant to CSEA's motion.^ As 
^The job description was not offered into evidence at the 
hearing. As Bulmer had not then had any role in negotiations, 
the Director concluded that it would not be appropriate to base a 
managerial determination on speculation about what Bulmer's role 
might be in future negotiations. Neither the Director's decision 
nor ours prohibits the City from seeking a managerial designation 
for Bulmer pursuant to an application filed under §201.10 of the 
Rules of Procedure based upon new evidence or changed 
circumstances. 
g/Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. , 14 PERB 1[3075 (1981) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
Board - CP-409 
-3 
timely service is a component of timely filing,-' the merits of 
the exceptions are not properly before us. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions must be, and 
hereby are, dismissed. SO ORDERED. 
DAT-ED: April—30,--19 9 7-
Albany, New York 
ft \^->v JL -VN< 
Pauline-RT Kihsella, Chairperson 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member If 
5/ld. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMES H. BRANCH, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE-NO. U-14896 
YONKERS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JAMES H. BRANCH, Pro se 
ANDERSON, BANKS, CURRAN & D0N06HUE (SUZANNE JOHNSTOWN and 
LAWRENCE THOMAS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by James H. Branch 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (AU) dismissing his 
improper practice charge alleging that the Yonkers City School 
District (District) violated §209-a.l(c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it denied him tenure and thereby 
terminated his employment. Branch alleges that the District's 
actions were taken in retaliation for his exercise of rights 
protected by the Act. 
The ALJ found that although Branch became a building 
representative of the Yonkers Federation of Teachers in September 
1992, and was denied tenure and terminated in June 1993, the 
District's action was not taken because of his assumption of the 
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union post but because of Branch's deteriorating performance, his 
increased absences from work, and complaints about him from 
parents, students and co-workers. The ALJ, therefore, dismissed 
the charge in its entirety. 
Branch's exceptions were filed by mail and were received by 
us on December 10, 1996. The District has sought dismissal of 
the exceptions on the ground, inter alia, that Branch did not 
comply with §204.10(a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). That 
section of the Rules requires that a copy of the exceptions be 
served upon all parties at the same time as the exceptions are 
filed and that proof of such service be filed with us. No proof 
of service of the exceptions on the District was filed 
simultaneously with the exceptions. In response to our inquiry, 
Branch asserts that he served the exceptions on the District in 
accordance with the requirements of the Rules but he has failed 
to provide proof of service. The District, in its affidavit in 
opposition to the exceptions, alleges that it was not served with 
the exceptions by Branch.^ 
We have consistently applied the service requirements of 
our Rules strictly when a party to a proceeding has raised an 
objection to a failure of service, as timely service is a 
-'The District was later sent a courtesy copy of the exceptions 
by the Board's Deputy Chairman and Counsel. This transmission 
did not satisfy the service requirements of the Rules nor cure 
the service defect. 
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component of timely filing.-' Branch did not serve the 
exceptions as required by our Rules, and indeed has no proof of 
service on the District at all.-7 As the District has objected 
to their consideration, the exceptions must be, and hereby are, 
dismissed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
\f\<*M 1 L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
g/Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp.. 14 PERB 13075 
(1981). (subsequent history omitted) 
^There is no indication on the exceptions Branch filed with PERB 
that he copied the District. Branch also did not file an 
affidavit of service with the exceptions when he filed with PERB. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., 
Upon a Complaint of Misconduct Pursuant 
to the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Relations Board. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ. 
FURY & KENNEDY, ESQS. (JOHN K. GRANT of counsel), for 
Complainant 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By letter dated May 1, 1996, Anthony V. Solfaro requested that 
we investigate alleged misconduct by Thomas P. Halley, Esq., during 
the processing of the captioned representation petitions. In 
C-4411, the Putnam Valley Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) 
sought to replace the New York State Federation of Police, Inc. 
(NYS Federation) as the bargaining agent for an existing unit of 
police officers employed by the Town of Putnam Valley. In C-4413, 
the New Paltz Police Association (Association) sought to replace 
the New Paltz Police Department Local, United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. (United Federation) as the bargaining agent for an 
existing unit of full-time and part-time police dispatchers 
employed by the Town of New Paltz. Solfaro represented both 
petitioners; Halley represented both incumbent unions. 
At its meeting of June 19, 1996, this Board reviewed Solfaro's 
request and authorized an investigation into Halley's alleged 
misconduct. On September 18, 1996, a hearing was held before the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to conduct the 
CASE NOS. C-4411 
& C-4413 
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investigation. On February 14, 1997, the ALT issued a report and 
recommendations. The ALJ concluded that the allegations of 
misconduct were properly before us for review and that Halley had, 
as alleged, deliberately engaged in misconduct of an aggravating 
character for the purpose of delaying the decertification of his 
clients.-7 
The parties were invited to respond to the AU's report and 
recommendations and Halley has done so in the form of exceptions. 
Halley argues that the misconduct complaint is not properly before 
us for review because Solfaro's letter refers to an inapplicable 
section of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), because it is time 
barred, and because his alleged misconduct did not take place at a 
"hearing". On the merits, Halley argues that his objections to the 
petition in the Town of New Paltz were made in good faith and that 
the election in the Town of Putnam Valley proceeded as scheduled 
despite his alleged misconduct. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we find that the complaint is properly before us for 
investigation and that Halley's actions constituted misconduct. 
This is the first time the Board has received a formal 
complaint that a party's representative has engaged in misconduct 
in conjunction with the processing of cases before the agency. 
Therefore, this proceeding and Halley's response raise threshold 
questions regarding our power to investigate and sanction 
1/The PBA won the election in C-4411 by a vote of 14 to 1. In 
C-4413, the Association won the election by a vote of 5 to 1. 
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misconduct and the meaning of the section of our Rules under which 
this investigation was conducted. 
Part 201 of our Rules governs the filing and processing of 
representation petitions. Section 201.9(e)(3) of that Part 
provides as follows: 
Misconduct at any hearing before an 
administrative law judge, the director or the 
board shall be grounds for summary exclusion 
from the hearing. Such misconduct, if of an 
aggravating character and engaged in by an 
attorney or other representative of a party, 
shall be grounds for suspension or disbarment 
from further practice before the board or its 
agents after due notice and hearing. 
Substantially similar rules apply to other of our 
proceedings.^ Solfaro's complaint refers incorrectly to §203.8 
of the Rules. Part 203 of the Rules pertains to proceedings to 
approve or review the procedures of a mini-PERB established 
pursuant to §212 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). Solfaro's citation error, however, does not deny us the 
power to investigate the allegations of misconduct nor did it, as 
Halley claims, result in a denial of his "due process" rights. 
We are empowered to investigate allegations of misconduct 
whether or not the complainant cites authority for the conduct of 
an investigation. If Solfaro's letter alleging misconduct by 
Halley had not cited to any rule, it could not be argued 
persuasively that we would thereby be rendered powerless to proceed 
pursuant to the complaint if we concluded that the nature of the 
^Rules, §§202.7(b); 203.8(g)(5)(iii); 204.7(j); 206.6(e)(3); 
210.2(c). 
( Board - C-4411 & C-4413 -4 
allegations warranted investigation. Only if the incorrect 
citation misled or prejudiced Halley in his defense of the 
misconduct allegations would there be any merit to his argument. 
For several reasons, however, there is no valid argument in this 
regard. 
First, the section of the Rules cited by Solfaro is 
substantively identical to §201.9(e)(3) of the Rules. Second, 
Halley has been on written notice from the ALJ since at least mid-
July 1996 that this investigation was being conducted pursuant to 
§201.9(e)(3) of the Rules, a statement reiterated by the ALJ at the 
hearing held on September 18, 1996. Moreover, Halley has been on 
notice since the complaint was filed as to the exact nature of the 
several allegations of misconduct being raised against him and he 
has been afforded several opportunities to respond orally and in 
writing to those allegations. Accordingly, Halley's due process 
rights have been fully satisfied. 
Halley also argues that we cannot consider the complaint 
because it was not filed until several months after the alleged 
misconduct took place. This argument misconstrues both the nature 
of the alleged misconduct and the purpose of our investigation into 
it. 
The misconduct alleged is not a single or isolated event. The 
ALJ found it to be a pattern and practice of baseless delaying 
tactics in several forms, which began soon after the petitions were 
filed in May 1995 and ran through the filing and clarification of 
election objections in October and November 1995. The PBA was not 
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certified in C-4411 until December 27, 1995, and the Association 
was not certified in C-4413 until January 31, 1996. Solfaro's 
complaint was dated May 1, 1996. 
For good reason, our Rules pertaining to the investigation of 
misconduct do not contain any time limits for filing complaints. 
We investigate allegations of misconduct to protect the rights of 
all persons and parties who appear before us, the statutory 
provisions pursuant to which they appear, and our own regulatory 
processes. To establish by decision a specific time limit for the 
filing of complaints of misconduct would constitute an abandonment 
of our obligations to the public, the Act and our Rules. 
Complaints of misconduct should be entertained if they are filed 
with reasonable expedition so long as there is no prejudice to the 
party being investigated. Solfaro's complaint was brought to our 
attention within approximately three months of the date the second 
of the two petitions was processed to completion, a reasonable 
period of time under any arguably analogous standard.-7 More 
importantly, Halley does not allege any prejudice to his ability to 
defend himself caused by the timing of the filing of the misconduct 
complaint. The complaint, therefore, is not time barred on any 
legal or equitable theory. 
Halley's last "jurisdictional" defense is that his alleged 
misconduct escapes our review because the misconduct did not occur 
-'An improper practice charge may be filed within four months of 
the alleged violation of the Act. Strike charges have no fixed 
filing period. 
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at a "hearing". Halley's argument in this regard rests on a 
mistaken assumption regarding the meaning of the word "hearing" in 
the rule and the intent in adopting that rule. 
Halley's argument assumes that the word "hearing" has but one 
meaning for all purposes in the administrative context. The 
assumption is that a hearing can be only a formal, trial-like 
proceeding at which witnesses are called, examined and cross-
examined. Although that is certainly a familiar type of hearing, 
it is not the only one. As recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court, the "term 'hearing7 in its legal context undoubtedly has a 
host of meanings."-7 Particularly in the context of our 
representation proceedings, which are investigatory in nature, and 
are often completed without a formal hearing, the term "hearing" 
includes all of the stages of party involvement upon which a record 
is developed for the purpose of enabling us to define the 
appropriate bargaining unit and to determine a union's majority 
status.-7 Misconduct occurring at any of the several stages made 
available to the parties for the presentation of evidence or 
argument relevant to the disposition of the questions presented to 
the agency for decision must fall within our power to investigate 
if the agency is to fulfill its statutory mandates regarding the 
disposition of representation questions. 
^United States v. Florida E. Coast R.R. Co.. 410 U.S. 224, 239 
(1973) . 
^Act §207. 
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This interpretation of our rule is further supported by its 
language and the absurdity of a contrary interpretation. 
As to the former, §201.9(e)(3) of the Rules refers to a 
"hearing" before the Board and the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). The Board does not itself 
hold trial-like hearings and the Director serves as a presiding 
officer at a formal hearing only occasionally. The Director is, 
however, actively involved with the pre-testimonial phases of a 
representation investigation, as is the Board actively involved 
with the post-testimonial phases of that investigation through its 
appellate review functions. The reference in the rule to the Board 
and the Director, therefore, clearly indicates that the rule was 
never intended to be restricted to misconduct occurring during a 
formal, trial-like hearing. Rather, those references plainly 
evidence an intent to give the word "hearing" a meaning which 
authorizes the investigation and sanction, as appropriate, of any 
misconduct which occurs at any point during the agency's gathering 
of the information upon which its decision will be made. 
As to the latter, adoption of Halley's interpretation of the 
rule would leave even admitted gross misconduct beyond our review 
and sanction if the party or representative engaged in that 
misconduct other than at a formal hearing, such as in the 
presentation of stipulations or offers of proof in lieu of 
testimony. The rule should not be read in a way to effect such an 
J 
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objectionable result.^ We could not effectively fulfill our 
statutory duty to resolve representation disputes if we did not 
also have the power to regulate practice before us at all stages of 
a proceeding before us. So obvious is this need to regulate 
practice-7 that an interpretation producing results wholly at odds 
with its satisfaction must be rejected as unreasonable and contrary 
to agency intent. 
Halley argues further that we must give the word "hearing" in 
our rule the narrow reading he gives it because the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) had given "hearing" in its comparable 
rule-7 the interpretation he advances. The argument is entirely 
unpersuas ive. 
The issue is not what the NLRB meant by its rule. The issue 
is what the Board meant when it adopted its rule in 1967. The 
NLRB's interpretation of its rule is not dispositive of the meaning 
of our rule and its intent is irrelevant to an assessment of our 
intent, just as the language of our rule and the intent in adopting 
it is irrelevant to the NLRB's interpretation of its rule. 
-
7Just as statutes are to be construed to avoid objectionable 
results, hardship, injustice, mischief, or absurdity, so, too, 
should an agency's rules. See N.Y. Stat., §§141-53 (McKinneys 
1971 & Supp. 1997). 
-
xThe power to regulate practice has been described as "organic" 
to a labor agency's very authority to conduct administrative 
proceedings. Association of Citv Employees and City of 
Jacksonville, 21 FPER f26,237 (Fla. Public Employees Relations 
Comm'n, Order No. 95E-197, 1995). 
5/As the AKJ noted in her report, the NLRB, in January 1997, 
adopted final rules making misconduct at any stage of its 
proceedings grounds for sanction. 
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Halley's argument might have had some merit if the NLRB's 
interpretation of its rule had been announced prior to the adoption 
of our rule. In that circumstance, and to the extent the language 
of the two rules was comparable, some argument perhaps could have 
been made that the intent underlying our rule matched that of the 
NLRB. As the ALJ observed, however, the NLRB's decision announcing 
that its rule applied only to misconduct occurring at a formal 
hearing issued many years after our rule was adopted.^ 
Having rejected Halley's jurisdictional defenses, only the 
merits of the misconduct allegations remain for discussion. In 
that regard, Halley takes only a limited exception to the ALJ's 
findings regarding the merits of the misconduct complaint. 
He argues first that he had a valid objection to the unit 
definition in C-4413. His claim in this respect is that he and the 
United Federation had a good faith doubt as to whether part-time 
dispatchers were in the existing unit either because they had no 
evidence that any part-time dispatchers were employed or, if so, no 
evidence that they were paying dues to the United Federation. 
The ALJ addressed this argument at some length in her report 
and we adopt her findings and conclusions, which are wholly 
supported by the record. The record establishes beyond doubt that 
Halley and the United Federation knew that part-time dispatchers 
were employed by the Town of New Paltz. In addition to other 
evidence proving that fact conclusively, the very document Halley 
^H.P. Townsend Mfa. Co.. 317 NLRB No. 174, 149 LRRM 1281 (1995). 
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submitted to the Director to support his contrary claim shows part-
time dispatchers employed. Nor is there any doubt that Halley and 
the United Federation knew that part-time dispatchers were in the 
existing unit in the Town of New Paltz. Again, in addition to 
other conclusive evidence, the United Federation's president, Ralph 
M. Purdy, wrote to the Town of New Paltz on June 27, 1995, 
demanding that the Town deduct dues on behalf of the Town's part-
time dispatchers precisely because they were in its unit. Halley 
received a copy of that letter. Moreover, Halley knew that the 
United Federation had for years, pursuant to an arrangement with 
the Town, collected dues directly from part-time unit employees and 
he knew or should have known that, since July 1995, pursuant to the 
United Federation's specific demand, the Town had been taking 
payroll deductions for the dues and fees of part-time dispatchers. 
Notwithstanding Halley's knowledge that part-time dispatchers 
were employed by the Town of New Paltz and that they were in the 
United Federation's unit, Halley raised and continued to raise in 
as many ways as possible a claim that part-time dispatchers were 
not and never had been in the United Federation's unit. When 
pressed for factual support for this claim, Halley submitted a 
single document which we find he knew inaccurately reflected the 
true state of fact and he knew would mislead the agency personnel 
to the advantage of his client, at least temporarily. 
As to C-4411, Halley had no valid objection whatever to that 
petition or an election pursuant thereto. Nonetheless, he 
persisted in linking that case with claims and arguments unique to 
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C-4413. He thereby caused the rescheduling and delay of the 
election in C-4411 for no reason, never informing the Director that 
there was no objection to the unit in C-4411 until after he had 
filed the election objections in that case, months after the 
petition was filed. 
As there are no exceptions taken to any other of the ALJ's 
findings regarding other acts of misconduct, and as those findings 
are completely supported by the record, we affirm and adopt them as 
our own. 
Halley's last argument is that any misconduct he may have 
committed should not be deemed to be of an "aggravating" character. 
That is an issue which is relevant under the rule only to 
suspension or disbarment from practice before the agency. As we 
are not suspending or disbarring Halley from practice before us, we 
need not determine whether his misconduct could be considered 
aggravating within the meaning of the rule. By any standard, 
however, Halley's misconduct was serious and inappropriate. His 
actions cannot be characterized and then justified as mere zealous 
advocacy. Zealous advocacy is appropriate and expected. It does 
not, however, include nonresponse where response is required, 
selective disclosure of facts with an intent to mislead and cause 
delay, or the persistent raising of issues and arguments lacking 
any good faith basis in law or fact. 
We can only conclude from this record that Halley's actions 
were intended to delay, without any arguable basis in fact or law, 
the processing of these two petitions to completion to enable his 
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clients to continue as the bargaining agents for the units for as 
long as possible. His misconduct compromised the statutory rights 
of these petitioners and the employees they were seeking to 
represent, and it has caused this agency to waste time and 
resources investigating meritless allegations and deciding 
frivolous issues. We are mindful, however, that this is the first 
misconduct investigation the Board has had to undertake and, as 
such, our views regarding the expected conduct of parties and 
representatives have not found prior written expression in relevant 
respect. We also note that Halley has not been accused of having 
engaged in related or other misconduct previously or since. We 
censure Halley7s conduct and warn him that his future misconduct in 
) conjunction with any cases before the agency will warrant harsher 
disciplinary action, including possible suspension or disbarment 
from practice before this agency. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEWBURGH FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 589, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14952 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY (ALISON C. FAIRBANKS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed by the Newburgh Firefighters Association, Local 589, IAFF, 
AFL-CIO (Association) and the City of Newburgh (City) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing the 
Association's charge that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
imposed a new procedure for financial disclosure on fire fighters 
receiving General Municipal Law (GML) §207-a benefits from the 
City. 
In March 1986, the Association and the City entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement for January 1, 1986 through 
December 31, 1987. They eliminated from that contract and each 
subsequent contract any reference to a GML §207-a procedure. 
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Instead, the parties agreed that a new GML §207-a procedure would 
be incorporated into the rules and regulations of the City's Fire 
Department. As here relevant, the procedure contains the 
following provisions: 
Section 13 
An individual who is receiving benefits under 
§207-a shall not engage in outside employment. 
Section 18 
(a) The Chief may periodically review cases of 
members receiving disability benefits for the purpose 
of determining whether the individual continues to be 
entitled to disability benefits, and in furtherance 
thereof may take such action as is appropriate under 
the law. 
Section 21 
Any claim of violation, misapplication, or 
misinterpretation of the terms of this procedure shall 
not be subject to review under the contractual 
grievance arbitration procedure, but shall be subject 
to review only by judicial proceeding. 
The procedure has remained in effect since 1986. 
At the hearing, the former president of the Association, 
Arthur Wilcox, testified that the Association agreed to the new 
§207-a procedure in exchange for certain contractual concessions 
and to remove the procedure for dealing with the denial of claims 
from the parties' contractual grievance procedure. Both Wilcox 
and John O'Reilly, the City's labor counsel, testified that the 
previous procedure of utilizing an arbitrator was unwieldy, time-
consuming and expensive. As Wilcox noted in his testimony: 
A. Yes. I mean what we were looking for was a 
procedure that treated all 
individuals in the 207-a process 
the same way and that it had due 
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process and a realistic way to 
proceed with things. 
Q. Okay. Now — 
A. And the other thing was that if the procedure 
didn't work at that point - we set it 
straight out to John O'Reilly and Chief Barry 
- we always had court action to challenge or 
decide—whether—the—1-aw—was—being—followed^ 
O'Reilly testified that the Association's representatives 
intended to turn the whole procedure over to the City and that it 
was the Association's articulated position that the individual 
fire fighters involved would work through the procedure with the 
City. Only if there was a dispute that the law was not being 
followed, would the Association go to court on the unit member's 
behalf. Wilcox's testimony differed from O'Reilly's in one 
relevant respect: 
And again, you know, if we weren't happy with the 
procedure, we still had open the avenue of going to 
court. If the City went beyond their 207-a powers, we 
would — we could go to court. Or if they attempted to 
get into areas that were mandatory topics of 
negotiation, we could demand negotiations or end up 
here on an IP or end up back in court if we weren't 
happy with the process. 
On June 10, 1993, the City Manager sent a letter to a unit 
employee who had been receiving GML §207-a benefits instructing 
him to complete an affidavit stating that he had not engaged in 
outside employment for the last three years and further directing 
him to provide the City with his tax returns for the three prior 
years and his spouse's W-2 forms, if, they had filed jointly.^ 
^The City also sent a number of similar letters to fire 
fighters who had retired pursuant to the disability retirement 
provisions of GML §207-a. 
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When the employee did not respond, the City sent him another 
demand. Subsequently, the employee executed the affidavit 
regarding outside employment, but he refused to provide the City 
the tax returns it had demanded. The Association thereafter 
filed this charge which, as amended, alleges: 
The negotiated procedure contains no provision for 
the procedures or affidavits referred to in the June 7 
and June 24, 1993 letters and the [City's] attempt to 
include these procedures and affidavits as a part of 
the previously negotiated procedure constitutes a 
unilateral change in the §207-a GML procedure as 
negotiated between the parties and agreed to by the 
[Association]. 
In its answer, the City raised as defenses to the charge 
timeliness, lack of jurisdiction and waiver. The ALJ decided 
that PERB had jurisdiction over the charge, but he held that §21 
constituted a waiver by the Association of any right to file a 
charge with PERB. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that 
the ALJ erred in dismissing the charge because there was no 
waiver. The City, in its cross-exceptions, argues that the ALJ 
erred by failing to dismiss the allegations in the charge 
relating to the letters it sent to retired fire fighters because 
they are not "public employees" within the meaning of the Act,27 
by not finding that the City had a managerial right to require 
financial disclosure, and by not finding that the City bargained 
in good faith with the Association. 
^The Association made clear on the record that the charge 
did not apply to retired fire fighters, whom it did not consider 
to be "public employees" within the meaning of the Act. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of 
the parties7 arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
Relying upon our decision in County of Nassau-7
 r the ALJ 
found that PERB had jurisdiction over the charge because the 
agreed upon procedure did not afford the Association "a 
reasonably arguable source of right" with respect to the subject 
of the improper practice charge. However, the ALT nevertheless 
went on to determine that the Association was alleging a 
"violation, misapplication or misinterpretation" of the terms of 
the negotiated §207-a procedure, thus triggering §21 of the 
procedures under which the Association had to proceed only in 
court with its challenges to the City's actions. We agree that 
the charge is within our jurisdiction, but on different grounds. 
The procedure as negotiated by the parties is a 
comprehensive GML §207-a system which sets forth the rights and 
obligations of unit members represented by the Association, and 
the rights and obligations of the City.-7 Section 18 of that 
contractual §207-a procedure prohibits the Chief from taking any 
action in reviewing continuing eligibility to receive benefits 
which is inappropriate under the law. There being no stated 
2/23 PERB 53051 (1990). 
-'The GML §207-a procedure was negotiated by the parties and 
was placed in the Fire Department's rules and regulations 
pursuant to agreement. The incorporation of this agreement into 
the departmental rules and regulations is immaterial to an 
assessment of our jurisdiction. It is not the form or the 
location of an agreement which determines our jurisdiction, but 
whether there is an agreement between the parties which arguably 
gives a charging party contract rights regarding the actions 
placed in issue under the improper practice charge. 
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exceptions, the "law" referenced is reasonably read to include 
provisions of the Act- This limitation on the Chief's power of 
review is a grant of a contractual right to the Association. The 
Chief is prohibited by the agreement of the parties from 
reviewing GML §207-a eligibility in any manner that violates the 
law. If, as the Association alleges in this charge, the Chief's 
new requirements constitute a unilateral change in a mandatorily 
negotiable subject, he has acted inappropriately under law and, 
therefore, necessarily in violation of the Association's 
contractual rights. However, such an action also, and 
independently, would be in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The charge, therefore, rests on both an arguable violation of 
contract and a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
While §205.5(d) of the Act deprives us of jurisdiction over 
a violation of a contract "that would not otherwise constitute an 
improper employer...practice," we maintain jurisdiction when all 
that is alleged is a violation of the Act.-7 Even though the 
alleged action might also constitute a violation of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement, if the language of the 
collective bargaining agreement merely incorporates rights under 
the Act, we are not divested of jurisdiction pursuant to 
§205.5(d) of the Act. 
The basic purpose of §205.5(d) of the Act is to prevent the 
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements except as 
necessary to the performance of our statutory functions. In this 
^Citv of Saratoga Springs, 18 PERB f3009 (1985). 
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case, the issue does not center on the contractual intent of the 
parties. As relevant to this proceeding, the contract right in 
Section 18 is defined entirely by reference to the rights and 
obligations of the parties under "law", which we have held 
includes the Act. If the Act has been violated, then the 
contract has been violated. The issue presented, therefore, is 
not a matter of contract interpretation. Rather, it centers 
completely on the meaning of the Act and the application of 
statutory policy, standards and criteria. Only questions of law 
within the special competence of this agency are raised by 
Section 18, not any issue of contract interpretation for 
resolution in other appropriate forums. 
In Saratoga Springs, supra. we held that we had jurisdiction 
over an alleged §209-a.l(d) violation which asserted a breach of 
an obligation flowing from the Act, even though the contractual 
language might have indirectly covered the subject matter of the 
charge. Saratoga Springs makes apparent, therefore, that there 
are certain limited circumstances in which there exists an 
improper refusal to negotiate under §209-a.l(d) of the Act even 
though the conduct in issue might also breach one or more 
provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement. In 
our opinion, this case offers an even clearer example of the type 
of contract violation which is within our jurisdiction under 
§205.5 (d) of the Act.^7 
^The language of Section 21 precludes us from deferring 
this charge to the parties' contractual grievance procedure 
because the parties there specifically removed disputes arising 
under the §207-a procedure from that grievance procedure. 
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The ALJ, holding that PERB had jurisdiction, nonetheless 
dismissed the charge, finding that the Association, by 
negotiating an alternative forum to litigate disputes over the 
application of the §207-a procedure, had knowingly and 
intentionally waived its right to bring an improper practice 
charge before PERB. We disagree. 
The ALJ relied on our decision in Board of Education of the 
City School District of the Citv of Buffalo (Buffalo CSD)*7 and 
Wilcox's testimony that the Association "always had a court 
action to challenge or decide whether the law was being followed" 
to support his decision to dismiss the charge. In Buffalo CSD. 
the parties had agreed that if the employee organization 
challenged an action through the contractual grievance procedure, 
it could not thereafter file an improper practice charge on that 
action. The employee organization filed a grievance and it 
subsequently filed an improper practice charge which dealt with 
the same subject matter as the grievance. We found that the 
employee organization had waived its right to proceed in more 
than one forum when it agreed at the bargaining table that an 
occurrence that had been grieved would not thereafter be the 
subject of an improper practice charge. We dismissed the charge, 
stating: 
While it is certainly true that §205.5(d) of the Act 
confers "exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction" upon PERB 
for the disposition of improper practice charges, we do 
not and have not construed this language to mean that 
parties may not waive rights conferred by the Act.... 
(at 3106) 
z/22 PERB f3047 (1989) . 
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While...we would not require parties to bargain 
concerning creation of a contractual remedy for 
violations of the Act, if parties choose to so 
negotiate, we construe their actions as constituting 
nothing more than a waiver of a statutory right to file 
a charge and not as a divestiture of our jurisdiction, 
(at 3107) 
i 
Here, we find that the language in Section 21 of the 
parties' §207-a procedure does not evidence a knowing, clear and 
unmistakable waiver of the Association's right to file an 
improper practice charge alleging that the City has violated the 
Act by requiring financial disclosure by employees receiving 
§207-a benefits.^7 If a party is to be denied access to this 
agency for the determination of alleged violations of the Act, 
the language of the waiver must be such as to permit no other 
interpretation. The language in Section 21, however, is 
susceptible to a reasonable interpretation that the Association 
merely waived the right to grieve the City's application of or 
alterations in the §207-a procedure. There is no reference in 
Section 21 to the Act in general, to PERB or to improper 
practices. Additionally, the testimony of Wilcox evidences that 
it was the Association's intention that issues involving 
mandatory subjects of negotiation would still be within the 
cognizance of PERB. As the language of the parties' agreement, 
both on its face and as testified to by the parties, does hot 
evidence a clear, knowing and explicit waiver of its right to 
^See State of New York fSUNY Albany). 11 PERB 53026 (1978), 
rev'd in part sub nom. CSEA v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 
17011 (3d Dep't 1982). See also Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist., 21 PERB 
13021 (1988); Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City 
of New York. 8 PERB 13011 (1975). 
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proceed before PERB, the ALJ's dismissal of the charge on this 
ground must be reversed. 
The ALJ did not decide the timeliness of the charge, as 
raised by the City, or the merits of the charge. It is, 
therefore, necessary to remand the charge to the ALJ for such 
other proceedings as are consistent with this decision. 
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is reversed 
and the matter is remanded to the ALJ. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
iA4 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J/. Schmertz, Member 
( } STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLAUDIA S. COCKERILL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-12187 
&-U-13887 
BRENTWOOD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CLAUDIA S. COCKERILL, Pro 36 
BERNARD T. CALLAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Claudia S. 
Cockerill to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing her improper practice charges alleging that the 
Brentwood Union Free School District (District) violated 
§209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by retaliating against her for her exercise of 
statutorily protected rights. In Case No. U-12187, Cockerill 
alleges that her request for a reassignment for the 1990-91 
school year was denied and she was assigned to three school 
buildings that year because she had earlier filed two improper 
practice charges and had taken other actions against the 
District. Cockerill alleges in Case No. U-13887 that the 
District again denied her a reassignment for the 1992-93 school 
year and issued various disciplinary memoranda to her in 
retaliation for filing the earlier improper practice charges. 
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The District's answers denied the charges and raised the defenses 
of timeliness and res judicata. 
The ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(b) allegations for failure of 
proof.-1 The ALJ further determined that Cockerill had been 
engaged in protected activity-7 and that the District was aware 
of her actions, but that the District had not been improperly 
motivated in its actions toward her and dismissed the §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) allegations in both charges. 
Cockerill excepts to the ALT's decision, arguing that the 
ALJ erred both factually and legally. As its response, the 
District filed a copy of its brief to the ALJ, which sought 
dismissal of both charges. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
For the 1986-87 school year, Cockerill, who has been a 
school psychologist employed by the District since 1965, was 
assigned to two of the District's secondary schools. Thereafter, 
she was reassigned to one secondary school and two elementary 
schools for the 1987-88 school year and to only elementary 
schools for the 1988-89 school year. She filed two improper 
practice charges, alleging that those transfers were in 
retaliation for the exercise of protected rights. Both charges 
were dismissed because there was no causal link between 
Cockerill's exercise of protected rights and her involuntary 
j ^Cockerill does not except to this part of the ALJ's decision. 
^The filing, prosecution and appeal of two earlier improper 
practice charges are the activities relied upon for this finding. 
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transfers.^ It was determined that the District had 
transferred Cockerill out of one of the secondary schools at the 
principal's request, and that the record supported the District's 
articulated need for a bilingual psychologist at one of the 
secondary schools and more psychologists at the District's 
elementary schools. 
Thereafter, Cockerill made repeated assignment requests for 
the school years 1989-90 through 1993-94. Since 1987, Cockerill 
has sought to be assigned to one or more of the District's 
secondary schools and has, as an alternative, sought transfer 
from certain elementary school assignments. While some of her 
reassignment requests have been granted, she has never been 
reassigned to a secondary school. 
Edyth Welch, the District's Coordinator of Health, 
Psychological and Social Work Services since 1987, is the 
administrator who makes the annual assignments of the District's 
psychologists and social workers. The A U found, and the record 
supports the finding, that Welsh was not improperly motivated in 
making her assignment decisions for the two school years covered 
by the instant charges. The ALJ found that the assignments were 
based upon the District's staffing needs, the personnel available 
to fill those needs, the assignment requests of the staff 
involved, and the preferences of the building principals. As 
there was no credible evidence of improper motivation in the 
^Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist. . 24 PERB 54510, aff'd, 24 PERB 
f3021 (1991), motion to reconsider denied,, 25 PERB f3027 (1992), 
appeal dismissed. 25 PERB 57003 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1992). 
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assignment decisions affecting Cockerill^, the ALJ dismissed 
those aspects of the two improper practice charges. The ALT 
likewise dismissed that portion of Case No. U-13887 which alleges 
that Cockerill received counselling memoranda and negative 
evaluations in 1990 and 1992 because of her protected activities, 
finding no evidence of improper motivation on Welch's part. 
Finally, the ALJ rejected Cockerill's claim that the timing of 
the District's actions, which coincided with the issuance of the 
decisions in the earlier improper practice charges and 
Cockerill's appeal of those decisions, both to us and to the 
courts, established that the District was improperly motivated in 
the actions which are the subject of these two charges. The ALJ 
' determined, overall, that the District's decisions regarding 
Cockerill's assignments, her evaluations and counselling 
memoranda, were motivated by legitimate business concerns. 
There is nothing in Cockerill's exceptions or the record 
taken as a whole which warrants or requires reversal of the ALJ's 
factual determinations or legal conclusions. What is apparent 
from the record is that Cockerill is an aggressive advocate of 
the children in the schools to which she is assigned. Throughout 
her tenure with the District, the methods and means of her 
advocacy have led certain school administrators, specifically in 
^Cockerill testified that an incident occurred involving Wayne 
Brodsky, the District's Director of Special Services, wherein he 
taunted her for losing the prior improper practice charges and 
told her that Welch should get her after everything died down. 
Brodsky denied that the event ever occurred and the ALJ credited 
his testimony. There is nothing in the record which would 
warrant disturbing the ALJ's credibility resolution. 
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the District's secondary schools, to refuse Cockerill's requests 
for assignment to their schools. The first of these requests 
pre-date any exercise of protected rights; indeed, they formed 
the basis for her initial improper practice charges. Welch has 
attempted to accommodate Cockerill's requests for reassignment 
but is limited because of the decreasing number of schools whose 
administrators will accept Cockerill as the assigned school 
psychologist. The record also establishes that there are 
additional reasons that Cockerill's assignment requests have not 
been granted, such as the need for bilingual psychologists (whiph 
Cockerill is not), the need for more psychologists in the 
elementary schools, and testing demands which vary from year to 
year. 
We find, therefore, that Cockerill has failed to establish 
that the District violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act with 
respect to her assignments for the 1990-91 and 1992-93 school 
years and in its issuance of the at-issue memoranda and 
evaluations. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
) STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17593 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
TAXATION AND FINANCE), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
' This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing as untimely its charge that the State of New York 
(Department of Taxation and Finance) (State) violated §209-a.l(d) 
i 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally imposed a new office dress policy for unit members 
working in the State's Buffalo Taxation and Finance (Tax) office. 
The charge relates solely to employees at the Buffalo Tax 
office. Since at least 1982, a state-wide policy relating to 
appropriate dress has been contained in the State's employee 
handbook and has been applicable to these employees. In relevant 
part, it provides: 
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Dress Code 
The department does not have a "dress code" and 
does not attempt to dictate the type or style of 
clothing worn by employees but it does insist apparel 
be consistent with reasonable standards of social 
acceptability, cleanliness, safety, and decency. Dress 
should also be appropriate to the type of work to which 
employees—are"assigned7™taking-"into~considerati-on--such 
factors as public visibility, sensitivities of fellow 
employees, health, and comfort. 
You should be aware that your personal appearance 
does affect public opinion and the impression you make 
on your co-workers. It reflects upon you and the 
department which you represent. 
Uncontroverted testimony offered by CSEA at the hearing 
establishes that, for several years, employees at the Buffalo Tax 
office have worn blue denim jeans to work, whether they were 
assigned to the office for the entire day or were there for part 
of the day before or after a tax seizure or auction out of the 
office. Indeed, one unit employee who frequently wore blue denim 
jeans was promoted in 1993. The record further establishes that 
unit employees in other Tax branch offices in Rochester and 
Brooklyn regularly wear blue denim jeans in the office without 
consequence. All unit employees are subject to the provisions 
relating to dress as set forth above in the employees' handbook. 
Donald Denny became tax compliance manager at the Buffalo 
Tax office in 1993. He testified that on several occasions from 
that time until December 1995, he had spoken to tax compliance 
agents and tax compliance representatives about wearing what he 
considered to be inappropriate office attire, such as short 
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shorts and blue denim jeans.^ He did concede that he could not 
see all of the unit employees at all times and that, as a result, 
there were occasions when unit employees had worn blue denim 
jeans and he had not spoken to them. On August 9, 1995, Denny 
issued the following memorandum to the Buffalo staff: 
Although the Department has no specific "dress code," 
daily dress should be appropriate based upon reasonable 
standards and the amount of contact with the public. 
For the remainder of the summer, however, you may dress 
in a casual manner on Fridays, as long as you are not 
scheduled to be in the field and/or meeting with 
members of the public. "Dress down" days will end on 
Friday, September 15, 1995. 
Please keep in mind this is a place of business and be 
reasonable in your choice of clothing. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Attached to the memorandum was a copy of the above-referenced 
portion of the employee handbook. 
On December 21, 1995, Denny informed a tax compliance agent 
that he could not deal with the public that day because he was 
wearing blue denim jeans. On December 26, 1995, Denny issued the 
following memorandum to all Buffalo unit employees. 
Subject: "appropriate dress" 
It has been brought to my attention that some staff are 
coming to work with inappropriate dress. Back in 
August I sent out a memo in reference to "dress down 
days". Along with it I attached a copy of the policy 
for dress code. 
My wording also includes the following: "Although the 
Department has no specific dress code, daily dress 
should be appropriate based upon reasonable standards 
and the amount of contact with the public. Please keep 
^CSEA represents tax compliance agents, tax compliance 
representatives and clerical employees. 
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in mind that this is a place of business and be 
reasonable in your choice of clothing." A short while 
ago, I had someone point to one of our employees as 
they were going through the door and ask, "Is that the 
maintenance man, I need to speak to him." Obviously 
this individual could not have been dressed 
appropriately or this would not have happened. 
If any further inappropriate instances come up, the 
individual—employee—wi-li—be—asked—to—return—home—to 7 
change. This is done on the employee's own time. For 
the individuals that have been and/or are doing the 
appropriate thing, thank you for your cooperation and 
professionalism. 
If you have any questions or comments please see your 
supervisor or myself. Thanks. 
This charge was then filed, alleging that Denny's prohibition of 
blue denim jeans on December 21 was a unilateral change in the 
office policy on appropriate dress because the wearing of blue 
denim jeans had previously been permitted and no negotiations had 
taken place between the State and CSEA which resulted in an 
agreement that blue denim jeans were not appropriate office 
attire. 
On March 28, 1996, Denny called four unit employees into his 
office and advised them that the blue denim jeans they were 
wearing were inappropriate. He told them that if they wore blue 
denim jeans again, they would receive a counselling memo and be 
sent home, on their own time, to change. CSEA amended its charge 
to include this incident. It is, however, undisputed that 
Denny's directive has not been implemented and no employee has 
yet been disciplined for wearing blue denim jeans. 
The ALJ found that unit employees had been consistently 
counselled about inappropriate dress since 1993 and that 
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Denny's August 9, 1995 memorandum reiterated this policy. The 
December 26, 1995 memorandum and the March 28, 1996 incident 
were, he found, simply restatements of a long-established policy. 
He, therefore, determined that the charge, filed more than four 
months after the issuance of the August memorandum, was untimely. 
Alternatively, the ALJ also found that there had been no change 
in practice because of the long-standing policy on appropriate 
office dress enunciated in the employee handbook. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ 
erred in finding the charge untimely and in determining that 
there had been no change in the past practice of permitting blue 
denim jeans to be worn. The State supports the ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and a consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
The charge is timely filed. The first time CSEA became 
aware that Denny considered blue denim jeans to be inappropriate 
office attire came when Denny advised a unit employee of his 
prohibition against blue denim jeans on December 21, 1995. 
CSEA's charge was filed on February 13, 1996, well within four 
months of when CSEA first became aware of Denny's interpretation 
of the State's policy relating to appropriate office attire.2/ 
The second announcement .of Denny's prohibition against denim blue 
jeans came on March 28, 1996. The amendment, filed on May 9, 
1996, is likewise timely. The ALJ measured the timeliness of the 
charge from Denny's August 9, 1995 memorandum. That memorandum, 
^Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a)(1). 
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however, is silent on the subject of blue denim jeans and nothing 
in the record even suggests that CSEA knew or should have known 
that Denny interpreted appropriate office attire as excluding 
blue denim jeans before the December 21 incident was reported. 
As the charge is timely, we turn to its merits. The State 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act if its prohibition against 
wearing blue denim jeans constitutes a unilateral change in a 
mandatorily negotiable subject. 
We have not had an opportunity before to decide the 
negotiability of a general dress code. We have, however, in the 
context of uniform requirements for law enforcement personnel, 
had occasion to determine that grooming standards involve terms 
and conditions of employment and are, generally, mandatory 
subjects of negotiation.-7 An office attire policy, not 
involving uniformed and/or para-military personnel, is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Our conclusion that the additional restrictions on dress 
imposed by Denny are mandatory subjects of negotiation is also 
consistent with our prior decisions on work rules-7, employee 
safety^7 and decisions on dress codes and grooming requirements 
^Citv of Buffalo. 15 PERB 53027 (1982). 
^Spencerport Cent. Sch. Dist.. 16 PERB 1(3074 (1983) ; Stueben-
Alleaanv BOCES. 13 PERB f3096 (1980); Police Ass'n of New 
Rochelle. 13 PERB J[3082 (1980). 
^CSEA. Inc. .- Niagara Chapter. 14 PERB f3049 (1981) . 
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of the National Labor Relations Board^7 and other labor 
relations agencies.^ 
We also believe that Denny's prohibition of the wearing of 
denim blue jeans by certain unit employees in the Buffalo Tax 
office changed the State's dress code policy. The State has only 
a general policy requiring appropriate office attire. That 
policy does not require or prohibit the wearing of any particular 
type of clothing. In this case, the State allowed unit employees 
to wear blue denim jeans without apparent restriction for several 
years. No employees were counselled or disciplined, indeed, an 
employee who regularly wore blue denim jeans was promoted shortly 
before Denny came to the Buffalo Tax office. Further, employees 
in other of the State's Tax offices wore blue denim jeans without 
hindrance from the State and still do. The unit employees, 
therefore, had a reasonable basis to believe that blue denim 
jeans were included in the definition of appropriate office 
attire. Denny's actions in December 1995 and March 1996 clearly 
impose greater restrictions on dress than the State has ever 
required before in that office and greater than those currently 
^Bav Diner. 104 LRRM 1407 (1980); Transp. Enter.. Inc.. 100 LRRM 
1330 (1979); Concord Docu-Prep. Inc.. 85 LRRM 1416 (1973). 
^Town of Dracut. Case No. MUP-3699 (Mass. Labor Relations 
Comm'n, May 28, 1980), aff'd CCH Public Employees Bargaining 
Reporter, 1980-83 Transfer Binder f42,027 (Sept. 30, 1980) 
(police grooming standards); Seward Educ. Ass'n. Case No. 34, 
Neb. Court of Industrial Relations (March 26, 1971), aff'd on 
other grounds. 1 PBC 510,134 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1972) (teacher dress 
code); Town of Stratford. Case No. MPP-3552, Dec. No. 1471 (Conn. 
State Bd. of Labor Relations 1976)(police dress code and grooming 
regulations). 
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existing in other offices. Moreover, for the first time, the 
code as created by Denny includes a disciplinary component for 
noncompliance. 
While an employer may announce the standards it will be 
utilizing in determining whether employees are in compliance with 
an existing employer policy,-7 here Denny has changed the policy 
itself, imposing a restriction that never existed and which does 
not exist for other, similarly situated, employees of the State. 
We find, therefore, that the State, by Denny's directives in 
December 1995 and March 1996, unilaterally changed the terms and 
conditions of employment of unit employees without negotiation 
with CSEA, in violation of §209-a.l(d) .2/ 
CSEA's exceptions are granted and the decision of the ALJ is 
reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement of 
Donald Denny's December 26, 1995 memorandum and 
directives of December 21, 1995 and March 26, 1996 
regarding a prohibition against wearing blue denim 
jeans in the Buffalo Tax office; 
2. Remove from unit employees7 personnel files 
any reference to or reprimand for wearing blue denim 
jeans in the Buffalo Tax office; and 
^Pouahkeepsie City Sch. Dist.. 19 PERB f3046 (1986). 
-
7In finding a violation premised upon a unilateral change in a 
mandatory subject of negotiation, we of course make no finding as 
to the reasonableness of the prohibition against the wearing of 
blue denim jeans. 
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3. Sign and post the notice in the form attached at 
all locations normally used by the State to post 
notices of information to unit employees at the Buffalo 
Tax office. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany—New—York-
Xk^  m ru< Pauline R. Kinsel la , ' "Chairperson 
Eric J. /Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLia£MPLOYEESLFAlR EMPLOYMENT AGT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Taxation and Finance) in the unit represented by 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and working in the Buffalo Taxation and Finance 
Office (Office) that the State will: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement of Donald Denny's December 26,1995 memorandum and directives of 
December 21,1995 and March 26,1996 regarding a prohibition against wearing blue denim jeans in the Office. 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
b' ny other material. 
( \ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WELLSVILLE SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-^ and= - CASE NO. C-4620 
WELLSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wellsville Substitute 
Teachers Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All substitute teachers who have received, and 
not responded negatively to, letters of 
reasonable assurance of continued employment in 
accordance with §590 of the Labor Law. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WELLSVILLE SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE-NO.—C- 462 0 
WELLSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wellsville Substitute 
Teachers Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All substitute teachers who have received, and 
not responded negatively to, letters of 
reasonable assurance of continued employment in 
accordance with §590 of the Labor Law. 
•i 
Certification - C-4620 page 2 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER/ IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wellsville Substitute 
Teachers Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
-i-nGiudes^ fehe~mu-feua-l--obl-i-ga-t-i©n--to—me e-t— at—re as ©na-bl-e—times—a-nd 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder,- and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
'- -" ^. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric iT". Schmertz, Member/ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF PAWLING POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4628 
VILLAGE OF PAWLING, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Pawling Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time and full-time police officers. 
Excluded: Police Commissioner and/or Chief of Police. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF PAWLING POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4628 
VILLAGE OF PAWLING, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by. the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Pawling Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time and full-time police officers. 
Excluded: Police Commissioner and/or Chief of Police. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Village of Pawling Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
4 i •. r Ml • 
PauLine R. Kinsel !a, Chairperson 
tA/<-
E r i c J>r Schmer t z , Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, 
Petitioner, 
_ -and- . _^ ____ CASE NO. C-4631 
VILLAGE OF NORWOOD, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 6 87 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees of the 
Village of Norwood classified as foremen and 
motor equipment operators. 
Excluded: All elected officials and management staff. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, 
Petitioner, 
^and- , CASE-NO—C-4-631 
VILLAGE OF NORWOOD, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 687 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees of the 
Village of Norwood classified as foremen and 
motor equipment operators. 
Excluded: All elected officials and management staff. 
Certification - C-4631 Page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 687. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
-wages-,—h©ur-s-,—and—©t-he-r—-te-rms—and—conditions-©fj—emp-l-©-yme-n-k-,—or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
w ll. C&L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 4^-
,x^^^Ct>oi-
Eric J/ Schraertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE AFL-CIO DIRECTLY AFFILIATED 
LOCAL UNION #24730, 
Petitioner, 
-and^ : CASE NO. C-4614 
BAY SHORE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED,that the New York State AFL-CIO 
Directly Affiliated Local Union #2473 0 has been designated, and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time 
security guards. 
Excluded: All others. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE AFL-CIO DIRECTLY AFFILIATED 
LOCAL UNION #2473 0, 
Petitioner, 
__ _and- CASE NO. C-4614 
BAY SHORE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State AFL-CIO 
Directly Affiliated Local Union #2473 0 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time 
security guards. 
Excluded: All others. 
Certification - C-4614 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New York State AFL-CIO 
Directly Affiliated Local Union #24730. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
rfc£- f LwJU 
Pauline R. *tihsella7 Chairperson 
Eric" 5£-^chmertz, Member 
~-\ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SPACKENKILL SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4599 
SPACKENKILL UNION FREE SCHOOL~DISTRrCT7 ~~~^ " "" ^~ 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Spackenkill Support Staff 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time typists, aides, 
monitors and stenographers. 
Excluded: Managerial/confidential employees, district 
office clerical staff, security and all others. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SPACKENKILL SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4599 
SPACKENKILL UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Spackenkill Support Staff 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time typists, aides, 
monitors and stenographers. 
Excluded: Managerial/confidential employees, district 
office clerical staff, security and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Spackenkill Support Staff 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai-rperson 
Eric Schmertz, Member 
